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Abstract
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improve-
ment over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability and the standard
Bayesian criterion of empirical significance. I argue that the criterion fails to meet
four of the conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow
from Sober’s position or are presumed in his arguments. I suggest to define empirical
significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does
meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian
criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains
falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those condi-
tions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out
falsifiability.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, Elliott Sober (1990; 1999; 2007; 2008) has developed and
defended a criterion of empirical significance, called ‘testability’, that is both promising and
much needed. The promise stems from Sober’s defense of the criterion’s basic assumptions
and the fact that it can deal with probabilistic theories and auxiliary assumptions. The
need for a criterion of empirical significance stems from, for example, questions about
the empirical significance of string theory (Smolin 2006, Woit 2006), scientific realism
(Sober 1990), theism (Diamond and Litzenburg 1975; Martin 1990, §2), and the theory
of intelligent design (ID), to which Sober (1999; 2007; 2008) applies his criterion. Given
the possible applications of a criterion of empirical significance and the simultaneous
wide-spread belief that the search for such a criterion has utterly failed (cf. Soames 2003,
ch. 13), it is somewhat surprising that Sober’s criterion has neither been subjected to much
scrutiny, nor led to further research into criteria of empirical significance; this is all the
more surprising because Sober’s treatment of ID is widely discussed. Together with its
companion piece (Lutz 2011), this article is meant to fill this gap.
Since Sober considers his definition of confirmation an explication (Sober 2008, 35)
and his definition of testability is an outgrowth thereof, it is plausible that the latter is also
meant as an explication.1 His definition is thus an explicatum for the explicandum that
could be circumscribed by pre-analytic terms like ‘having empirical content’, ‘making ob-
servational assertions’, ‘predicting experimental outcomes’, or ‘being an empirical theory’.2
The latter term is particularly apt, because Sober (2007; 2008, §2.8) intends to improve
upon Popper’s criterion of falsifiability, which was proposed as a demarcation criterion
between empirical and non-empirical theories (Popper 1935, §4; 1963, §II).
One desideratum of an explication is that it must be possible to use the explicatum in
place of the explicandum in the relevant contexts (Carnap 1950, §3; Hempel 1952, 663),
which often leads to a variety of conditions of material adequacy that an explicatum has to
fulfill. I will argue that Sober’s assumptions and the intended application of his criterion of
empirical significance lead to six such conditions (§3.1), one of them the condition that a
probabilistic criterion of empirical significance should contain falsifiability as a special case
(§3.2). I then show that Sober’s definition of testability meets only two of the conditions
of adequacy (§4).
1Sober (2010, 1) states as much in an unpublished note.
2I will distinguish between use and mention and between concepts and their names only when this improves
clarity or readability.
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In light of these shortcomings of contrastive testability, I suggest to define that a theory
makes observational assertions if and only if it is not empirically equivalent to a tautology,
and to call a theory empirically significant if and only if it makes observational assertions.
This criterion of empirical significance relies only on concepts that Sober accepts and fulfills
all six conditions of adequacy (§5).
2 Contrastive testability
According to Sober (2008, 24–30), whole theories typically cannot be assigned probabil-
ities. With the help of auxiliary assumptions A, however, a theory H can often at least
assign a probability Pr(O |H ∧ A) to an observation O, called the likelihood of H for O.3
This consideration leads him to a criterion of empirical significance that only relies on
likelihoods (Sober 2008, 152). With slight modifications that avoid some problems (Lutz
2011, §3.1), the criterion is given by
Definition 1. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 if and only if there are auxiliary
assumptions A and an observation sentence O such that
(I) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are defined,
(II) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A),
(III) A is justified, and
(IV) the justification of A
a) does not depend on H1 or H2 being justified and
b) does not depend on O or ¬O being justified.
The conditions (III) and (IV) are meant to restrict the auxiliary assumptions to those
that are “suitable” for testability (Sober 2008, 144). However, the restrictions are so
weak that given the assumptions that Sober (2008, 145) makes in the justification of
restriction (IVb), his criterion falls prey to a trivialization proof (Lutz 2011, §4.2).
To bracket the problems with the restrictions on the auxiliary assumptions, I suggest
3I will follow Sober in treating observational claims and theories as single sentences, and the auxiliary
assumptions as a finite set thereof. Finite sets of sentences are identified with the conjunctions of their
members. Mostly (and always for the auxiliary assumptions), the restriction to single sentences—in effect
a restriction to finite axiomatizations—is only a matter of notational convenience; I will note whenever it is
essential. I will furthermore always silently assume that Pr(C) 6= 0 for any occurring conditional probabilities
Pr(B |C), and that for any theory H and auxiliary assumptions A, Pr(H ∧ A) 6= 0, so that specifically A 6 ¬H.
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Definition 2. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions A
if and only if there exists an observation sentence O such that Pr(O |H1∧A) and Pr(O |H2∧A)
are defined and
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) . (1)
Note that H1 can be tested against H2 according to definition 1 if and only if H1 can be
tested against H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions that fulfill restrictions (III) and (IV). The
probability terms can be taken to have sets of reals from the unit interval as their values.
Some of these values (e. g., sets other than intervals) may be unacceptable for probabilities,
so that one or the other term in the inequality is undefined. Then, taking Sober’s use of
probabilities into account, there are two possible interpretations of the inequality (Lutz
2011, §3.2):
1. When all sets of reals are acceptable, the inequality is true if and only if the two sets
differ. Otherwise, it is false.
2. When some sets of reals are unacceptable, the inequality is true if and only if its
two sides are defined and different, or one side is defined and the other one is not.
Otherwise, the inequality is false.
Sober assumes that some probabilities are undefined, that is, interpretation 2.
To arrive at a criterion of empirical significance not defined relative to the auxiliary
assumptions, I suggest to restrict the sets of auxiliary assumptions to honest sets:
Definition 3. A is an honest set if and only if every S ∈ A is a justified sentence, and A also
contains every sentence on which the justification of S depends.
Arguably, an honest set is a set of sentences that, for all we know, could have been our
set of background assumptions: It describes which set of justified beliefs we hold now (if
A is simply the set of all our currently justified beliefs), or which set we could have held
before we got to hold all our current justified beliefs. The subjunctive here excludes false
starts, that is, beliefs that at one point were justified but later became unjustified. This
is plausible, as it is of little interest whether a theory is empirically significant under the
assumption that the world is different from the way it in fact is (as far as we know). In
this sense, an honest set is one step in the accumulation of our currently justified beliefs.
Definition 3 allows
Definition 4. Theory H1 can be tested against theory H2 if and only if H1 can be tested
against H2 relative to an honest set of auxiliary assumptions.
This criterion avoids the trivialization proof for definition 1. To distinguish clearly between
concepts that are defined relative to auxiliary assumptions (as in definition 2) and those
that are not (as in definition 4), I will refer to the latter sometimes as absolute concepts.
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Sober calls his criterion simply ‘testability’, but the qualifier ‘contrastive’ distinguishes
it clearly from the ordinary language term and emphasizes that, atypically, the empirical
significance of one theory is defined relative to another. It may seem problematic to expli-
cate a one-place predicate like ‘makes observational assertions’ by a two-place predicate
like contrastive testability. However, many successful explications involve a change of the
logical structure, as the explication of ‘warm’ by ‘warmer than’ and finally ‘temperature’
illustrates (Carnap 1950, §4). But unlike ‘warmer than’, contrastive testability is symmetric:
The definiens is invariant up to logical equivalence under exchange of H1 and H2. Thus
contrastive testability does not provide a means to decide which of two theories is what
could be called ‘more empirically significant’. And this may be a problem. What is more, in
some passages Sober himself uses ‘testability’ like a one-place predicate. For instance, he
claims that ‘Undetectable angels exist’ is untestable and that ‘This coin has probability of .5
of landing heads’ is testable, which is, strictly speaking, meaningless for a two-place predi-
cate like contrastive testability. And both claims are important for Sober’s line of argument,
since he relies on the first to argue that testability is different from meaningfulness, and on
the second to argue that falsifiability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance.
Thus, even Sober seems to rely tacitly on a concept of empirical significance that is not
captured by contrastive testability. I will argue in the following that contrastive testability
as given by definitions 2 and 4, while formally correct, does not capture what Sober intends.
The definitions are materially inadequate.
3 Conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical signifi-
cance
In this section, I will argue that Sober’s assumptions and his intended application of the
criterion lead to six conditions of adequacy. Many of these relate empirical significance
to concepts that rely on inferences and therefore have a deductive and a probabilistic
formulation. This is because deductive inference (entailment: B  C) clearly does not
generalize probabilistic inference (e. g., Pr(B) = 1 and Pr(C |B) = q, thus Pr(C) = q). But
probabilistic inference also does not generalize deductive inference. For assume that the
domain has infinite cardinality. Then it may be that Pr(C |B) = 1, but there are cases in
which B is true and C is false. This happens, for example, when the domain is the interval
[0, 2] with a uniform probability distribution, B is ‘x ≤ 1’, and C is ‘x < 1’ (cf. Feller 1971,
33f).
This difference between the deductive and the probabilistic concept of inference gen-
erally leads to differences between the deductive and probabilistic formulations of the
conditions of adequacy, which in turn may lead to one criterion of deductive empirical
significance (in the following sometimes shortened to ‘deductive criterion’) and a sepa-
rate criterion of probabilistic empirical significance (‘probabilistic criterion’). A theory
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may then be called empirically significant (simpliciter) if and only if it is deductively or
probabilistically empirically significant.
3.1 Conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance
(A) The criterion should not be trivial. A trivial definition, one that includes all or
no objects of the domain, cannot be a good explicatum for a concept that is meant to
include some, but not all objects of the domain. At the very least, a trivial explicatum is
uninformative. Since Sober intends to distinguish between theories that are worthy to be
pursued and theories that are not, his criterion must not be trivial, and he implicitly relies
on this condition of adequacy when arguing for his own definition (Sober 2008, 145; cf.
Lutz 2011, §4.2).
(B) The criterion should include all and only theories that make observational asser-
tions. Popper (1935, 85) justifies his criterion of falsifiability with the assumption that
all and only theories that make observational assertions are empirically significant (cf. Lutz
2011, §2.1). That assumption itself is justified by Ayer (1936, 97), who argues that “the
purpose” of an empirical theory is “to enable us to anticipate the course of our sensations”.
If Ayer’s argument is sound, empirical significance is a necessary and sufficient condition
for making observational assertions.
Sober (2008, 130) states that “a testable statement makes predictions, either by de-
ductively entailing that an observation will occur or by conferring a probability on an
observational outcome.”4 Thus for Sober empirical significance is a sufficient condition
for making observational assertions. Let this be condition (i). Sober also subscribes to the
converse of condition (i) as can be seen from his claims that “[t]he problem with the hy-
pothesis of intelligent design is [ . . . ] that it doesn’t predict much of anything” (Sober 2008,
§2.15) and that his “criticism of the design argument might be summarized by saying that
the design hypothesis is untestable” (Sober 2008, 148).5 Since Sober (2008, §2.12) infers
the lack of empirical significance from the lack of observational assertions, his criticism of
ID relies only on condition (i). However, Sober’s criticism of Popper’s falsifiability criterion
does seem to rest on the converse of condition (i) for probabilistic assertions: ‘This coin
has probability of .5 of landing heads each time it is tossed’ makes a probabilistic assertion,
and its lack of falsifiability is a reason for Sober to reject Popper’s criterion. This seems to
assume that every theory that makes probabilistic assertions is empirically significant.
4Since Sober does not use ‘prediction’ to refer exclusively to claims about the future, I will treat it as
synonymous with ‘assertion’.
5When Sober (1999, 54) states that “hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on their own; they
require supplementation by auxiliary assumptions if they are to be tested”, he similarly seems to be treating
testability and the making of observations simply as synonyms.
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Sober (2008, 52, n. 29) further states two relations between deductive empirical
significance and the making of deductive observational assertions:
If a true observation sentence entails H [ . . . ] you can conclude without further
ado that H is true; this is just modus ponens. And if H entails O and O turns out
to be false, you can conclude that H is false [ . . . ]; this is just modus tollens.
These are two sufficient conditions for empirical significance, namely (ii) entailment by an
observation sentence and (iii) entailment of an observation sentence. Condition (iii) is the
converse of condition (i) for deductive assertions (cf. Sober 1999, 72, n. 14). Therefore,
according to Sober all and only theories that make observational assertions are empirically
significant.
Condition (ii), however, is incompatible with condition (i): For any sentence S and
observation sentence O, O  O ∨ S, that is, O ∨ S is empirically significant according to
condition (ii). But let S be such that it does not make observational assertions, that is, for
any observation sentence O′, S 6 O′, and S does not confer any probability on O′. Then,
as a matter of logic, O ∨ S 6 O′, so O ∨ S does not make deductive assertions. O ∨ S also
does not confer a probability on any observation sentence, since the inferences one can
draw from O ∨ S are weaker then those that one can draw from S, and S already does not
allow to assign a probability to any observation sentence. Thus O ∨ S does not make any
observational assertions and is therefore not empirically significant according to condition
(i), which is incompatible with condition (ii). On pain of inconsistency, Sober therefore has
to choose whether all theories entailed by observation sentences are empirically significant
or whether all theories that are empirically significant make observational assertions. Given
that his core argument against ID is that ID fails to make assertions, I take it that he would
choose the latter.6
(C) The criterion should exclude all theories that are empirically equivalent to tau-
tologies. What it means for a theory to make probabilistic assertions may not be com-
pletely clear, especially since some probabilities may be undefined. It will therefore be
convenient to also have a plausible corollary of condition (B), starting from the observation
that a tautology > makes no deductive assertions, since B ∧ >  C only if B  C , and
makes no probabilistic assertions either, since adding a tautology to any set of sentences
does not change the probabilities that can be assigned to the other sentences in the set.
Therefore, tautologies should be excluded by any criterion of empirically significance.
Flew (1950, 258) goes so far to call every theory a tautology that does not make
observational assertions, but this is clearly to strong: ‘Borogroves are mimsy’ is not a tautol-
6Note that the claim “There is an intelligent designer” is equivalent to “There is a human designer or there
is a non-human designer” and thus analytically entailed by an observation sentence like “There are humans
who design”. Arguably, however, “There is a non-human designer” does not make an observational assertion,
so that “There is an intelligent designer” does not either.
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ogy, but on account of containing two undefined terms, does not make any observational
assertions. Rather, any theory that makes the same observational assertions as a tautology
should be taken as not empirical significant. Unlike condition of adequacy (B), which
relies on some criterion for the making of observational assertions, condition (C) relies on
a criterion for empirical equivalence, the making of the same observational assertions. Out
of caution, one may treat the empirical non-equivalence to a tautology as a necessary, but
not as a sufficient condition for empirical significance.
(D) The criterion should not rely on the probabilities of whole theories or likelihoods
of the negations of whole theories. Sober (2008, 24–30) argues that for many theories
H the probabilities Pr(H |A), Pr(H |O ∧ A), and Pr(O |¬H ∧ A) are undefined (cf. Sober
1990, §III). A criterion that relies on these probabilities would therefore be unusable in
many cases.
(E) The criterion should be equivalent to an adequate Bayesian criterion of empiri-
cal significance whenever all occurring probabilities are defined. Since Bayesianism
relies on probabilities of whole theories and likelihoods of negations of whole theories,
Sober rejects it as a general method of scientific inference. Instead, Sober (2008, 37)
suggests likelihoodism, which relies only on the likelihoods of theories, but notes (cf. Sober
2008, 32):
The likelihoodist is happy to assign probabilities to hypotheses when the assign-
ment of values to priors and likelihoods can be justified by appeal to empirical
information. Likelihoodism emerges as a statistical philosophy distinct from
Bayesianism only when this is not possible.
Since there are criteria of empirical significance that have been developed within Bayesian-
ism, this suggests that a probabilistic criterion of empirical significance should be equivalent
to one of these Bayesian criteria whenever all probabilities are defined. This Bayesian
criterion should, of course, fulfill all criteria of adequacy other than (D).
(F) The probabilistic criterion should contain as a special case an adequate criterion
of deductive empirical significance that relies only on modus ponens. Sober (2002,
69f) sees a smooth transition between probabilistic and deductive modus ponens. More
specifically, Sober (2008, 50) points out the following:
(Update) Prthen(H |O) is very high
O
O is all the evidence we have gathered between then and now.
Prnow(H) is very high
8
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This is nothing other than the rule of updating by strict conditionalization.
(Update) is a sensible rule, and it also has the property of being a generalization
of deductive modus ponens.
As argued at the beginning of this section, (Update) is not, strictly speaking, a gen-
eralization of modus ponens. But at least when all and only sentences with probability 1
are certain, deductive and probabilistic inference coincide. This can be put more precisely
as follows. Each structureM of a language L of predicate logic assigns a truth value to
each sentence in L . If PrM is defined as the function that assigns 1 to all sentences true in
M and 0 to all sentence false in M, then PrM is a probability assignment (see appendix,
claim 9). Call such probability assignments truth value-like. For truth value-like probability
assignments, probabilistic inferences and deductive inferences coincide: The possible val-
ues of Pr(C |B) are restricted to 0 and 1, and Pr(C |B) = 1 if and only if B  C (as always
assuming that Pr(B) 6= 0; see appendix, claim 10). Truth value-like probabilities may be
assigned by fiat, but they also occur more or less naturally when there are no regularities
whatsoever, so that no probabilities can be assigned to sentences that are not known to be
true and thus have probability 1 or known to be false and thus have probability 0.7
In this sense, then, there can be a smooth transition between probabilistic and de-
ductive inference. Given that all and only theories that make deductive or probabilistic
assertions must be empirically significant by condition of adequacy (B), there must then
also be a smooth transition between any criterion of probabilistic empirical significance
and a criterion of deductive empirical significance that uses the implications of the theory
only in a modus ponens. As I will say, the probabilistic criterion must contain as a special
case a deductive criterion that relies only on modus ponens. Of course, the deductive
criterion should fulfill all those conditions of adequacy that also have purely deductive
formulations, that is, conditions (A), (B), and (C). To fulfill condition (B), it is enough
for the deductive criterion to include all and only theories that make deductive assertions,
because it is impossible that it could include theories that make only probabilistic asser-
tions. Analogously, it is enough if the criterion excludes all theories that are deductively
empirically equivalent to a tautology to meet condition (C).
Independently of any smooth transition in the case of modus ponens, it is clear that the
criterion of empirical significance simpliciter should be a generalization of an adequate
deductive criterion. Thus, when deductive and probabilistic inference coincide, the proba-
bilistic criterion must not include theories that the deductive criterion excludes. For if it
did, these theories would be included by the criterion of empirical significance simpliciter,
and thus this criterion would not generalize the deductive criterion, but rather contradict
it.
∗ ∗ ∗
7This is arguably the case in Popper’s approach to induction (cf. Salmon 1967, §II.3).
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While I have tried to mention supporting arguments for these conditions of adequacy
when possible, some of them remain controversial; especially condition (D) would be
challenged by Bayesians. But these conditions all follow from Sober’s basic assumptions
or apply to Sober’s criterion because of its intended application. Of course, it may be that
these conditions of adequacy are incompatible, so that some have to be given up. This
is the case for conditions (i) and (ii) discussed under condition of adequacy (B). But a
criterion of empirical significance that is to be applied as Sober intends should fulfill as
many of these conditions as possible.
3.2 Falsifiability is the unique adequate criterion of deductive empirical sig-
nificance
Condition of adequacy (F) demands that the deductive criterion contained in the proba-
bilistic criterion can be phrased in terms of modus ponens and fulfills all those conditions
of adequacy that pertain to deductive criteria. In this section, I want to show that these
conditions uniquely determine falsifiability.
Definition 5. A theory H is falsifiable relative to auxiliary assumptions A if and only if there
is an observation sentence O with A 6 ¬O such that O ∧ A ¬H.8
This definition can be combined with definition 3:
Definition 6. A theory H is falsifiable if and only if it is falsifiable relative to an honest set
of auxiliary assumptions.
Sober (1999, 48–57) defends many of the assumptions on which falsifiability depends
against criticisms (see also Lutz 2010, §2). As for the conditions of adequacy:
To show that a criterion is not trivial and thus fulfills condition (A), it is enough to give
a positive and a negative instance of the criterion. If S is the negation of an observation
sentence, then S is falsifiable relative to ∅. If S is a first order sentence without identity
and none of the terms in S occur in observation sentences, then S is not falsifiable relative
to ∅, assuming that all observation sentences are of first order.9 Thus definition 5 is not
trivial. If S is the negation of an observation sentence, then S is also absolutely falsifiable
according to definition 6, for it is falsifiable relative to ∅, which is an honest set according
to definition 3. Thus there is a falsifiable sentence. I will not attempt to prove that there
is a non-falsifiable sentence, because this would amount to finding a sentence that is not
falsifiable relative to any honest set. The proof is immediate for tautologies, but impossible
for contingent theories without more precise notions of justification and dependence.
8To allow sets of sentences and higher order logic, the definition must be phrased as “A theory H is falsifiable
relative to assumptions A if and only if there is a set Ω of observation sentences with Ω ∪ A 6 ⊥ such that
Ω ∪H ∪ A⊥”, where A and H are sets of sentences and ⊥ is some contradiction.
9This follows from Craig’s interpolation theorem (Hodges 1993, theorem 6.6.3).
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That falsifiability includes all theories that make deductive assertions is already pointed
out by Sober (1999, n. 14), who remarks that if “H ∧ A deductively entails O, and A is
known to be true, then, if we observe not-O, we can conclude that H is false.” Note that
Sober here assumes that the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation
sentence. Under this assumption, condition (B) uniquely determines the criterion of
relative falsifiability, if it is further assumed that a theory makes deductive assertions if and
only if it entails observation sentences not entailed by the auxiliary assumptions alone:
Definition 7. A theory H makes deductive observational assertions relative to assumptions
A if and only if there is an observation sentence O such that H ∧ A O and A 6 O.10
Definition 7 is equivalent to Sober’s definition of ‘having observational implications’ (Sober
2008, 151) except that the problem of suitable auxiliary assumptions is bracketed. Sober
uses restrictions (III) and (IV) from definition 1 to determine the auxiliary assumptions,
which, however, allows a trivialization proof (Lutz 2010, §9.2).
Definition 7 leads to
Claim 1. If the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation sentence, then a
theory H is falsifiable relative to A if and only if it makes deductive observational assertions
relative to A.
Proof. If O, A, and H are sentences, the proof is immediate. If O, A, and H are sets, the
claim follows immediately from claim 11 (see appendix).
The condition on observation sentences is not only implicitly assumed by Sober, but
follows also from the most common restrictions on observation sentences (Lutz 2011,
§4.2). Therefore relative falsifiability arguably meets condition of adequacy (B).
Claim 1 also establishes that absolute falsifiability meets condition (B) if and only if
it is the case that a theory makes deductive assertions iff it makes deductive assertions
relative to an honest set. But even if the definition of an honest set turns out to be wanting
in some respect, there is no obvious reason to doubt that the auxiliary assumptions suitable
for falsifiability are also suitable for the making of assertions. Rather, since background
assumptions are usually considered to be independent from the concepts that rely on
them, this is a fairly plausible conjecture. Under this conjecture, all equivalence results
between relative concepts transfer to absolute concepts, and it will be silently assumed in
10To allow sets of sentences and higher order logic, the definition must be phrased as “A theory H makes
deductive observational assertions relative to assumptions A if and only if there are a set Ω of observation
sentences and an observation sentence O such that Ω ∪ H ∪ A  O and Ω ∪ A 6 O”. If a logic is compact,
Ω ∪ H ∪ A  O if and only if there is a finite set Ω′ such that Ω′ ∪ H ∪ A  O, which is equivalent to
H ∪ A∧Ω′→¬O. Hence in first order logic this definition reduces to definition 7 if the set of observation
sentences is closed under truth-functional composition.
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the following. Claim 1 also establishes that both falsifiability and relative falsifiability can
be phrased so that they rely only on modus ponens.
Condition of adequacy (C) is fulfilled because no theories that are deductively empiri-
cally equivalent to a tautology > are falsifiable:
Definition 8. Two theories H1 and H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to
auxiliary assumptions A if and only if for all observation sentence O, H1 ∧ A  O iff
H2 ∧ A O.11
Claim 2. If the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation sentence, H is
falsifiable relative to A if and only if H and > are not deductively empirically equivalent
relative to A.
Proof. H is not deductively empirically equivalent to> if and only if there is an observation
sentence O such that either H ∧ A O and A 6 O or H ∧ A 6 O and A O. Since the latter
disjunct is logically impossible, this is equivalent to H making deductive observational
assertions relative to A. Since the negation of an observation sentence is assumed to be
observational, this is equivalent to H being falsifiable relative to A by claim 1.12
Only falsifiability and equivalent criteria fulfill condition (B) in the deductive case, and
so it is good news that falsifiability can be phrased in terms of modus ponens and fulfills all
other conditions of adequacy that pertain to criteria of deductive empirical significance. To
meet condition of adequacy (F), any criterion of relative probabilistic empirical significance
must therefore contain relative falsifiability as formulated in definition 7 as a special case.
Then the corresponding absolute criterion also contains absolute falsifiability as a special
case.
4 Contrastive testability and the conditions of adequacy
Condition of adequacy (A) is that a criterion of empirical significance must not be trivial,
and definition 1 does not meet this condition. Definition 4 does, however: Choose A=∅,
two non-observational, non-equivalent sentences S and S′, and, for some observation
sentence O, H1  S ∧ Pr(O) = p and H2  S′ ∧ Pr(O) = q for some probabilities p and q.
Then H1 and H2 are never equivalent, and H1 can be contrastively tested against H2 if
and only if p 6= q, so that many theories can and many theories cannot be tested against
each other relative to A. Since ∅ is an honest set, H1 and H2 can also be absolutely tested
11To allow sets of sentences and higher order logic, the definition must be phrased as “Two theories H1 and
H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to assumptions A if and only if for every set Ω of observation
sentences and every observation sentence O, Ω ∪H1 ∪ A O if and only if Ω ∪H2 ∪ A O”.
12The proof for sets of sentences is analogous, except for an additional existential quantification over sets of
observation sentences.
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against each other. Similarly to the case of absolute falsifiability, it is impossible to prove
that there are non-equivalent theories that cannot be tested against each other relative to
any honest set without more precise notions of justification and dependence.
Though non-trivial, contrastive testability fails to meet the two most important condi-
tions of adequacy, conditions (B) and (C). That some theories that do not make probabilistic
assertions and are probabilistically empirically equivalent to tautologies are contrastively
testable can be inferred from an example that Sober (1999, n. 24) attributes, in a different
context, to Greg Mougin:13
Let H1 = God created the eye, E = Jones is pregnant, A = Jones is sexually
active, and H2 = Jones used birth control. It is possible to test H1 against H2;
given independently attested background assumptions A, E favors H1 over H2.
In the example, the observation sentence E is assigned one probability by the background
assumptions alone (since H1 is not about Jones at all), and another by the conjunction of
the background assumptions and H2. Now choose H1  >. Then H1 does not make any
assertions and hence no observable ones, and it has trivially as much empirical content
as a tautology. But H1 can still be contrastively tested against H2, both relative to A and
absolutely, since the justification of A does not depend on E, H1, or H2.
By design, contrastive testability does not rely on prior probabilities or the likelihoods
of the negation of theories and thus meets condition of adequacy (D). Contrastive testa-
bility fails to meet condition (E) simply because so far, no Bayesian criterion of empirical
significance has been suggested that is equivalent to contrastive testability when all occur-
ring probabilities are defined. Specifically, relative contrastive testability is not equivalent
to the typical Bayesian criterion of empirical significance (cf. Sober 2008, 150) given by
Definition 9. Observations are relevant for theory H relative to auxiliary assumptions A if
and only if there is an observation sentence O such that
Pr(H |O ∧ A) 6= Pr(H |A) . (2)
That the two concepts are not equivalent is clear from their logical structures.
In principle, a probabilistic two-place predicate may contain a deductive one-place
predicate as a special case. For example, if the probability assignments are truth value-like,
‘Pr(O |H1) = .5 ∨ Pr(O |H2) = 1’ is equivalent to ‘H2  O’ because the first argument,
H1, becomes irrelevant. In this sense, the two-place predicate of contrastive testability
could therefore contain the one-place predicate of falsifiability as a special case. But
since contrastive testability is symmetric, either both or neither of its two arguments are
irrelevant for truth value-like assignments and thus it cannot meet condition (F).
13Unlike in the example by Salmon (1971, 29–88), it is this time not John Jones who is using birth control,
but his wife.
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H1 can be tested against H2 if and only if their defined likelihoods differ for at least
one observation sentence. If only singleton sets of probabilities are acceptable (as Sober
assumes for his criterion), this means that at least with respect to one observation, one of
the two theories must be wrong. Arguably, then, contrastive testability explicates what it
means for two theories to be probabilistically empirically incompatible for the special case
that only singleton sets of likelihoods are acceptable. This is borne out by the comparison
with
Definition 10. Theories H1 and H2 are deductively empirically incompatible relative to
auxiliary assumptions A if and only if there there is an observation sentence O such that
H1 ∧ A O and H2 ∧ A ¬O.
Claim 3. Let H1 and H2 be deductive theories, let all probability assignments be truth value-
like, and let the set {0,1} be unacceptable as a value of a likelihood. Then H1 can be tested
against H2 relative to A if and only if H1 and H2 are deductively empirically incompatible
relative to A.
Proof. H1 can be tested against H2 if and only if there is an observation O such that the
likelihood of one theory for O is 0, while the other one is 1. Without loss of generality,
assume Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = 1 and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) = 0, that is, Pr(¬O |H2 ∧ A) = 1. By claim 10
(see appendix), this holds if and only if H1 ∧ A O and H2 ∧ A ¬O.
Thus, if only singleton sets are acceptable as values of likelihoods, then contrastive
testability contains as a special case a criterion for deductive theories that relies only on
modus ponens. It is only the wrong one.
5 Explicating probabilistic empirical significance
Contrastive testability does not meet all criteria of adequacy, but that might just be because
the criteria cannot all be met at once. I will argue that this is not so by suggesting a
criterion of empirical significance that does meet all the conditions. First, however, I want
to discuss an intuitively attractive but inadequate criterion.
One may think of defining that a theory is not empirically significant if and only if
it cannot be tested against any theory. But this definition is inordinately inclusive. For
assume that H1 is not such that all assertions from suitable auxiliary assumptions become
undefined, that is, Pr(O |A) and Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) are defined (though possibly identical) for
some O and some suitable A. Then H1 is empirically significant if there is any H2 such that
Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) is defined and different from Pr(O |A). For if Pr(O |A) = Pr(O |H1 ∧ A), H1
can be tested against H2, and if Pr(O |A) 6= Pr(O |H1 ∧ A), H1 can be tested against any
tautology. The premises of this argument are commonly true, for example, according to
Sober, if H1 is ‘God created the eye’, O is ‘Jones is pregnant’, and A is ‘Jones is sexually
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active’, for then H2 can be ‘Jones used birth control’. Choosing H1  >, the argument shows
that tautologies are empirically significant, which runs afoul of conditions of adequacy (B)
and (C). It is also straightforward to show that conditions (E) and (F) are not met.
5.1 Probabilistic empirical equivalence
A more promising path to a criterion of probabilistic significance leads through the crite-
rion of probabilistic empirically equivalence. To show that contrastive testability does not
fulfill condition (C) it was sufficient to produce one contrastively testable theory that is
probabilistically empirically equivalent to a tautology. To arrive at a criterion of empiri-
cal significance that provably fulfills (C), however, it is necessary to define probabilistic
empirical equivalence.
Luckily, it is possible to explicate condition of adequacy (C) in line with Sober’s position,
for he states that “empirically equivalent theories have identical likelihoods” for any
observation sentence O (Sober 1990, 399). Treating the case of undefined likelihoods
explicitly, this leads directly to
Definition 11. Theories H1 and H2 are probabilistically empirically equivalent relative to
auxiliary assumptions A if and only if for all observation sentences O,
(I) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are not defined or
(II) Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) and Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) are defined and Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A).
As defined, probabilistic empirical equivalence contains deductive empirical equiva-
lence as a special case:
Claim 4. Let H1 and H2 be deductive theories and let all probability assignments be truth
value-like. Then H1 and H2 are probabilistically empirically equivalent relative to A if and
only if H1 and H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to A.
Proof. If all probability assignments are truth value-like, then interpretation 1 and interpre-
tation 2 of inequality (1) are equivalent, independently of whether {0, 1} is an acceptable
set of probabilities. For if {0, 1} is an acceptable set, the interpretations are trivially equiv-
alent; if {0,1} is not acceptable, the inequality is false if and only if both likelihoods have
the value {0}, {1}, or {0,1}/undefined. Otherwise, the inequality is true.
Therefore, it suffices to prove the claim for interpretation 1. H1 is probabilistically
empirically equivalent to H2 relative to A if and only if for all observation sentence O,
H1 ∧ A restricts the probability to the same set of values as H2 ∧ A. Since for any H,
Pr(S |H ∧ A) = 0 if and only if Pr(¬S |H ∧ A) = 1, this is the case if and only if for every
sentence, H1 ∧ A restricts the probability to 1 iff H2 ∧ A does. By claim 10 (see appendix),
this holds if and only if H1 ∧ A and H2 ∧ A entail the same observation sentences, that is, if
H1 and H2 are deductively empirically equivalent relative to A.
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Another reason to consider definition 11 a good explication of probabilistic empirical
equivalence is that, if all occurring probabilities are defined, it bears the same relation
to the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance given in definition 9 as the criterion
of deductive empirical equivalence bears to falsifiability: If two theories are deductively
empirically equivalent, then either both or neither are deductively empirically significant
(see appendix, claim 12). Analogously, the following holds:
Claim 5. If all occurring probabilities are defined and H1 is probabilistically empirically
equivalent to H2 relative to auxiliary assumptions A, then, relative to A, observations are
relevant for H1 if and only if observations are relevant for H2.
Proof. If O is any observation sentence for which Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧ A), then
Pr(O |H1 ∧ A) = Pr(O |A) if and only if Pr(O |H2 ∧ A) = Pr(O |A). Therefore Pr(H1 |A) =
Pr(H2 |O ∧ A) if and only if Pr(H2 |A) = Pr(H2 |O ∧ A) (see appendix, claim 13). Thus
observations are relevant for both H1 and H2 or for neither.
5.2 Probabilistic observational assertions
It follows from claims 1 and 2 that a theory makes deductive observational assertions
if and only if it is not deductively empirically equivalent to a tautology. This suggests
that conditions of adequacy (B) and (C) are in fact equivalent, so that a theory makes
probabilistic observational assertions relative to auxiliary assumptions A if and only if it
is not probabilistically empirically equivalent to a tautology relative to A according to
definition 2. This leads to
Definition 12. Theory H makes probabilistic observational assertions relative to auxiliary
assumptions A if and only if there exists an observation sentence O such that
(I) Pr(O |H ∧ A) is defined if and only if Pr(O |A) is not defined or
(II) Pr(O |H ∧ A) and Pr(O |A) are defined and Pr(O |H ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |A).
Claim 6. H makes probabilistic assertions relative to A according to definition 12 if and only
if H is not probabilistically empirically equivalent to a tautology relative to A according to
definition 11.
Proof. Let ðOxñ stand for ðx is an observation sentenceñ, ðDx yñ stand for ðPr(x | y ∧
A) is definedñ, and ðEx yzñ for ðPr(x | y ∧ A) = Pr(x | z ∧ A)ñ. Then it is straightforward to
prove that
∃x{Ox ∧ [(Dx y↔¬Dxz)∨ (Dx y ∧ Dxz ∧¬Ex yz)]}
 ¬∀x{Ox → [(¬Dx y ∧¬Dxz)∨ (Dx y ∧ Dxz ∧ Ex yz)]} (3)
Since Pr(O |> ∧ A) = Pr(O |A), the claim follows.
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With the help of definition 3 of an honest set, one can give
Definition 13. Theory H makes probabilistic observational assertions if and only if H makes
probabilistic observational assertions relative to an honest set A of auxiliary assumptions.
It may be considered problematic that a theory H makes assertions if assuming H
makes it impossible to assign a probability to an observation sentence that otherwise
would be assigned a probability by the auxiliary assumptions. To render such theories
empirically non-significant, the biconditional in condition (I) of definition 12 could be
made into a conjunction. However, it is very plausible that for a theory H that makes
no predictions, Pr(O |H ∧ A) is defined whenever Pr(O |A) is defined. For if Pr(O |A) is
defined, then, given A, one must expect a specific regularity of occurrences of O. But
if Pr(O |H ∧ A) is undefined, one must expect a breakdown of this regularity, and this
expectation is plausibly a prediction. An example would be the prediction that under
specific circumstances, some law fails that was assumed to hold universally. It certainly
is pragmatically relevant when some observation sentence can, contrary to the auxiliary
assumptions, not be assigned a probability.
Definitions 12 and 13 rely only on concepts that Sober uses himself, and should
therefore be conceptually unproblematic for him. He does not discuss the domains of
applicability of the concepts, but with one exception, the domains can just be assumed to
be the same for definitions 12 and 13 as they are for contrastive testability. The exception
is the term Pr(O |A). Sober could argue that the concept of a likelihood cannot be applied
to tautologies because the auxiliary assumptions themselves assign probabilities to no
or too few observation sentences. Sober (2008, 29f) in fact shortly discusses Pr(O), but
not in connection with auxiliary assumptions. The discussion therefore does clearly not
apply to definition 12, and it does not apply to definition 13 because H is testable if
there are some, not necessarily tautological, suitable auxiliary assumptions A such that
Pr(O |H∧A) differs from Pr(O |A). Sober’s original definition 1 and definition 3 of an honest
set put no restrictions on individual elements of A except that they be justified (in Sober’s
definition, independently of a specific observation sentence and two specific theories).
Therefore whole theories can be included in the auxiliary assumptions. Since Sober
introduces auxiliary assumptions to allow for actual scientific practice, and assertions made
by scientific theories in fact often rely on other scientific theories as auxiliary assumptions,
such an inclusion obeys letter and spirit of Sober’s criterion. Since scientific theories H are
supposed to make observational assertions, Pr(O |H ∧ A) will often be defined. And the
inclusion of H into the auxiliary assumptions is then just the notational change to Pr(O |A∗)
with A∗  H ∧ A .
It now follows from condition of adequacy (B) that all and only theories that fulfill defi-
nition 12 (13) are probabilistically empirically significant (relative to auxiliary assumptions
A). Without any basic conceptual problems, a theory can then be defined to be empirically
significant (relative to A) if and only if it it makes observational assertions (relative to A),
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that is, if and only if it makes probabilistic observational assertions (relative to A) or it
makes deductive observational assertions (relative to A).
As argued in §3.2, falsifiability fulfills all appropriate conditions of adequacy. I now
want to show that this new definition of probabilistic empirical significance does, too. That
it is non-trivial and thus meets condition of adequacy (A) is easily shown since sentences
without any terms that occur in observation sentences are not testable relative to ∅. And
in the example with Jones’s pregnancy, the theory that Jones uses birth control (H2) has a
different likelihood in conjunction with the auxiliary assumption A that Jones is sexually
active than A alone, and therefore H2 is testable relative to A. This example also shows that
there are positive instances of absolute testability. As in the case of absolute falsifiability, it
is impossible to prove that there is a non-tautological theory that makes no probabilistic
predictions relative to any honest set without more precise notions of justification and
dependence.
That analogues of restrictions (III) and (IV) of definition 1 cannot be substituted for
the restriction to honest sets can be shown as follows:14 Let the observation sentence O
and the auxiliary assumptions A be such that Pr(O |A) is defined. For instance, A might
express that 1 out of 10 vases of some kind breaks when dropped from a specific height,
and O express that the vase does not break on some specific drop. Let furthermore S be
such that it entails O. For instance, S might express that that specific vase does not break
when dropped a hundred times from a that height. Then S is justified independently of
O when the vase has been dropped 99 times without breaking, so that O, S, and A fulfill
conditions (III) and (IV) for any theory that is not related to vases. For a theory that
makes assertions about vases, it should not be difficult to find analogous sentences O′, S′,
and A′ about something else. Since S and A are justified independently of O, ¬O, and H,
so is A∗  (¬H ∨ S) ∧ A. Since Pr(O |A∗) 6= Pr(O |H ∧ A∗), H would make predictions if
restrictions (III) and (IV) of definition 1 were substituted for the restriction to honest sets.
Luckily, definition 13 is stricter than it would be with analogues of restrictions (III)
and (IV). The restriction of the auxiliary assumptions in definition 4 to honest sets entails
restriction (III). And while the restriction to honest sets does not entail restriction (IVb),
it precludes all trivializations precluded by that restriction: A theory H fails to make
probabilistic assertions because of restriction (IVb) only if for any S whose inclusion in A
would lead to Pr(O |H ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |A) for some O, the justification of S depends on O or
¬O. In that case, (IVb) ensures that H makes no probabilistic assertion. The restriction
of A to honest sets leads to the same result, because if the justification of S depends on
O (or ¬O) and A is honest, then O ∈ A (or ¬O ∈ A). Thus P(O |H ∧ A) = 1 = P(O |A) (or
P(O |H ∧ A) = 0 = P(O |A)). Unlike restriction (IVb), the restriction to honest sets also
leads to identical likelihoods if (¬H ∨ S) ∈ A is justified by a sentence S  O, thereby
precluding the trivialization proof in the previous paragraph. The restriction to honest sets
14The analogues of the restrictions feature only one theory H rather than two theories H1 and H2.
18
Sebastian Lutz On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II—Draft: 2011–04–10
also precludes any trivialization that restriction (IVa) could preclude, for if an element of A
depends on H, H ∈ A, so that Pr(O |H ∧ A) = Pr(O |A) for all O.
Definitions 12 and 13 trivially fulfill condition of adequacy (B). Because of claim 6,
they meet condition (C) as well. Since condition (C) only states that empirical equivalence
to a tautology is a sufficient condition for empirically non-significance, (C) is also met if
the biconditional of condition (I) in definition 12 is substituted by a conjunction, so that
more theories are empirically non-significant.
By design, definitions 12 and 13 fulfill condition of adequacy (D). Condition of ade-
quacy (E) is met because of
Claim 7. If all occurring probabilities are defined, then H makes probabilistic observational
assertions if and only if observations are relevant for H.
Proof. For all observations O, Pr(O |H∧A) 6= Pr(O |A) if and only if Pr(H |O∧A) 6= Pr(H |A)
(see appendix, claim 13). Therefore there is an O such that Pr(O |H ∧ A) 6= Pr(O |A) if and
only if there is an O such that Pr(H |O ∧ A) 6= Pr(H |A).
Definition 12 fulfills condition of adequacy (F), because it generalizes falsifiability, or
rather definition 7:
Claim 8. Let H be a deductive theory and let all probability assignments be truth value-like.
Then H makes probabilistic observational assertions relative to A if and only if H makes
deductive observational assertions relative to A.
Proof. Since interpretation 1 and interpretation 2 of the inequality in condition (II) are
equivalent, it suffices to prove the claim for interpretation 1. H does not make probabilistic
assertions relative to A if and only if for every observation sentence O, H ∧ A restricts
the probability to the same set of values as A. This is the case if and only if for every
observation sentence, H ∧ A restricts the probability to 1 iff A does. By claim 10 (see
appendix), this holds if and only if H ∧A and A entail the same observation sentences, that
is, if and only if H makes no deductive observational assertions relative to A.
Note that the proof also holds if the biconditional of condition (I) in definition 12 is
substituted by a conjunction, because then H makes no observational assertions if and only
if for all O, H ∧ A restricts the probabilities to the same set of values as A, or A restricts the
probabilities more than H ∧A. But the latter is impossible since A restricts the probabilities
of an observation sentence to {0} or {1} only if H ∧ A does. If the suitable auxiliary
assumptions for falsifiability are given by honest sets, condition (F) is also fulfilled by
definition 13.
Therefore, definition 12 and arguably definition 13 fulfill all conditions of adequacy
that Sober wants a criterion of empirical significance to meet. Additionally, they also make
it possible to evaluate one theory, ID for example, independent of another one like ET.
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Finally, the claims in which Sober uses testability as a one-place predicate are not only
meaningful, but also correct: ‘Undetectable angels exist’ arguably makes no observational
assertions relative to any honest set of sentences, and ‘This coin has a probability of .5
of landing heads each time it is tossed’ makes observational assertions, for it assigns a
probability of .5 to an observation sentence relative to ∅.
6 Conclusion
Contrastive testability fails as a criterion of probabilistic empirical significance because it
fails to meet four criteria of adequacy that follow from Sober’s position and the intended
application of contrastive testability: It includes some theories that make no observational
assertions, and some theories that are empirically equivalent to tautologies. It is not
equivalent to a Bayesian criterion of empirical significance when all probabilities are
defined, and it does not contain falsifiability as a special case. This last property is
important because a criterion of probabilistic empirical significance should contain some
adequate criterion of deductive empirical significance as a special case, and falsifiability is
the only adequate criterion.
Given that contrastive testability is not an adequate criterion of empirical significance,
I have suggested to consider a theory empirically significant if and only if it does not
make observational assertions. This definition fulfills all six conditions of adequacy, and in
particular contains both falsifiability and the Bayesian criterion of empirical significance as
special cases. The criterion could be called a synthesis, as it is acceptable for falsificationists,
Bayesianists, and likelihoodists alike. The hope is that it will also lead to agreement on the
empirical significance of string theory, scientific realism, theism, and ID.
20
Sebastian Lutz On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II—Draft: 2011–04–10
A Additional proofs
Claim 9. For every language L and everyM, PrM :PL → {0,1}, PrM(Σ) = 1⇔M  Σ
is a probability assignment.
Proof. Show that for all Σ,Ξ ∈ L and anyM it holds:
1. PrM(Σ)≥ 0,
2. PrM({>}) = 1, and
3. if Σ and Ξ are finite and Σ ∪Ξ ⊥, PrM({∧Σ ∨∧Ξ}) = PrM(Σ) + PrM(Ξ).
1 and 2 are immediate. 3 holds because for Σ ∪ Ξ  ⊥, M 6 Σ or M 6 Ξ, so that
PrM(
∧
Σ ∨∧Ξ) = 1 if and only if either M  Σ or M  Ξ but not both, which holds if
and only if PrM(Σ) = 1 or PrM(Ξ) = 1 but not both, that is, PrM(Σ) + PrM(Ξ) = 1
Claim 10. For any sets Σ,Ξ ⊆ L of sentences, Σ  Ξ if and only if for all M it holds: If
PrM(Σ) 6= 0 then PrM(Ξ |Σ) = 1.
Proof.
Σ  Ξ⇔∀MM Σ⇒M  Ξ (4)
⇔∀MPrM(Σ) = 1⇒ PrM(Ξ) = 1 (5)
⇔∀M

PrM(Σ) 6= 0⇒ PrM(Ξ |Σ) = PrM(Ξ)PrM(Ξ ∪Σ) = 1

(6)
Claim 11. If H ∪ A 6 ⊥ and the negation of an observational sentence is observational,
the following holds: There is a set Ω of observation sentences such that Ω ∪ A 6 ⊥ and
Ω ∪ H ∪ A  ⊥ if and only if there are a set Ω of observation sentences and an observation
sentence O such that Ω ∪H ∪ A O and Ω ∪ A 6 O.
Proof. ‘⇒’: If Ω ∪ H ∪ A  ⊥, then Ω ∪ H ∪ A  O for any observation sentence O. Since
Ω ∪ A 6⊥, there is some O such that Ω ∪ A 6 O.
‘⇒’: For O and Ω with Ω∪H ∪A O and Ω∪A 6 O, Ω∪{¬O}∪A 6⊥ and Ω∪{¬O}∪
H ∪ A⊥.
Claim 12. If the negation of an observation sentence is again an observation sentence, and
H1 is deductively empirically equivalent to H2 relative to A, then, relative to A, H1 is falsifiable
if and only if H2 is falsifiable.
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Proof. Assume that for all observation sentences O and sets of observation sentence Ω,
H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O if and only if H2 ∪Ω ∪ A  O. Then, for all Ω and O, H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O and
Ω ∪ A 6 O if and only if H1 ∪Ω ∪ A O and Ω ∪ A 6 O. Thus there are Ω and O such that
H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O and Ω ∪ A 6 O if and only if there are Ω and O such that H1 ∪Ω ∪ A  O
and Ω ∪A 6 O. By claim 1, this means that H1 is falsifiable relative to A if and only if H2 is
falsifiable relative to A.
Claim 13. If Pr(H |A) is defined, then Pr(H |O ∧ A) = Pr(H |A) if and only if Pr(O |H ∧ A) =
Pr(O |A).
Proof. The claim follows immediately from
Pr(H |O ∧ A)
Pr(H |A) =
Pr(O |H ∧ A)
Pr(O |A) . (7)
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